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Abstract 
A recent study claimed to have obtained evidence that participants can solve invisible multi-step 
arithmetic equations (Sklar et al., 2012). The authors used a priming paradigm in which reaction times 
to targets congruent with the equation’s solution were responded to faster compared to incongruent ones. 
Here we critically reanalyze the data set of Sklar et al. and show that the claims being made in the article 
are not fully supported by the alternative analyses we apply. A Bayesian reanalysis of the data 
accounting for the random variability of the target stimuli in addition to the subjects shows that the 
evidence for priming effects is less strong than initially claimed. That is, although Bayes factors revealed 
evidence for the presence of a priming effect, it was generally weak. Second, the claim that unconscious 
arithmetic occurs for subtraction but not for addition is not supported when the critical interaction is 
tested. Third, the data show no sign of genuine number processing as derived from V-shaped response 
time curves for prime-target distances. Fourth, we show that it is impossible to classify reaction times 
as resulting from congruent or incongruent prime-target relationships, which should be expected if their 
results imply that participants genuinely solve the equations on each trial. In sum, we conclude that the 
claims being made in the original article are not fully supported by the analyses we apply here. Together 
with a recent failure to replicate the original results and a critique of the analysis based on regression to 
the mean, we argue that the current evidence for unconscious arithmetic is inconclusive. We argue that 
strong claims require strong evidence, and stress that cumulative research strategies are needed to 
provide such evidence. 
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Introduction 
In their article, Sklar et al. (2012) claimed to have shown that participants can solve complex arithmetic 
equations non-consciously, i.e., in the absence of consciously perceiving the equations. Specifically, 
they examined whether the presentation of multi-step additions and subtractions with three single-digit 
operands (e.g., “9-3-4 =”, “3+1+4 =”) and without the result (2 and 8, respectively) would bias the verbal 
enumeration of a subsequently presented, visible number. Thus, the experiments by Sklar et al. were 
designed to test for “priming” effects, in which the exposure to a stimulus (or, prime) influences the 
response to a second stimulus (or, target)1. Following the seminal work by Meyer and Schvaneveldt 
(1971), priming has been widely used in the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience to infer 
the structure of semantic representations, including the representation of numerical values (Dehaene, 
Molko, Cohen, & Wilson, 2004; Knops, 2016). In the case of Sklar et al., target numbers were either 
congruent or incongruent with the result of the prime equation. For example, the target number “2” is 
congruent with the result of the equation “9-3-4 =”, while numbers “3” or “5” are incongruent. Repeated 
measures analysis of variance (rm-ANOVA) revealed significantly shorter response times (RTs) for 
congruent as compared to incongruent priming trials. Rather surprisingly, this congruency priming 
effect was significant for subtractions, but not for additions2. The authors concluded from these data 
“that uniquely human cultural products, such as […] solving arithmetic equations, do not require 
consciousness” (p.19617). 
 
For the following reasons, we believe that it is crucial to reexamine whether the claims made by Sklar 
et al. (2012) are fully supported by the available data. From a theoretical standpoint, the claim of “doing 
arithmetic nonconsciously” is a strong claim and, hence, demands strong evidence. Most cognitive 
scientists would agree that the complex nature of the underlying cognitive processes renders it 
implausible, rather than plausible, that effortful arithmetic operations may be performed without 
consciousness. Specifically, multi-step additions and subtractions as used by Sklar et al. cannot be 
solved by declarative fact retrieval from long term memory alone. Successful performance would 
necessitate that arithmetic rules can be initiated and followed unconsciously, and that the unconscious 
intermediary results are stored in working memory. So far, there exists only a single study on 
unconscious addition making the former claim (Ric & Muller, 2012). Furthermore, considering the 
                                                          
1
 Please note that the study by Sklar et al. also included experiments on “non-conscious reading” that will not be 
addressed here. Instead of priming, Experiments 1-5 used a variant of interocular suppression (breaking CFS) in 
which the time to target detection is the dependent variable. The extent to which this paradigm can provide 
evidence for unconscious processing has been called into question, however (Stein & Sterzer, 2014). 
2
 Priming effects for additions were only observed when Sklar et al. modified the experimental design and used a 
different dependent measure. In Experiment 9, equations with two single-digit operands (e.g., “8+7 =”) were 
unconsciously presented, and participants had to report whether a subsequently presented visible addition equation 
with two single-digit operands and result (e.g., “9+6=15”) was correct or not. The results showed that participants 
made significantly fewer mistakes in compatible trials (3.2 %) than in incompatible trials (4.4 %). We do not 
address this weaker finding in our article. 
4 
 
technical setup adds to the a priori implausibility of the effect reported by Sklar et al. They used 
continuous flash suppression (CFS) to render the prime equations invisible for up to two seconds. 
Following the introduction of this interocular suppression method (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005), a very 
heterogeneous picture has emerged about the extent to which high-level unconscious visual processing 
is possible under CFS (Ludwig & Hesselmann, 2015; Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 
2014; Yang, Brascamp, Kang, & Blake, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence for 
Sklar and colleagues’ premise that CFS allows for more unconscious processing because “it gives 
unconscious processes ample time to engage with and operate on subliminal stimuli” (p.19614). On the 
contrary, it may rather be that long suppression durations (Experiment 6: 1700ms and 2000ms; 
Experiment 7: 1000ms and 1300ms) are associated with a particularly deep suppression of visual 
processing under CFS (Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006), and extended periods of invisible 
stimulation have been shown to lead to negative priming influences (Barbot & Kouider, 2011).  
 
The goal of the current article is to provide a critical reexamination of the claims made by Sklar et al. 
(2012) based on the data they collected. We do so by approaching the original data set from different 
angles, and we assess whether the conclusions based on the original results still hold when taking the 
results of these new analyses into account. In the next sections, we provide five reanalyses of the data 
obtained by Sklar et al. First, we verified the repeatability of the reported analyses. This was a crucial 
first step that guaranteed we were analyzing the same data set as the original study. Second, we analyzed 
the data using a Bayesian linear mixed-effects models with crossed random effects for participants and 
stimuli, relying on Bayes factors to quantify how strongly the data support the predictions made by one 
statistical model compared to another. Indeed, throughout our reanalyses we are explicitly interested in 
quantifying the degree to which the data provide evidence for the claims that were made in the original 
study. It has been argued that classical significance testing approaches are not explicitly connected to 
statistical evidence, whereas the Bayes factor provides the possibility to quantify evidence in a coherent 
framework (Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016). This motivated us to rely on the Bayes factor throughout 
our reanalyses (except for the last one, see further). Third, Sklar et al. (2012) claimed that the congruency 
effect was observed for subtraction equations but not for addition equations. However, the interaction 
between congruency and operation was never tested although it is critical to ensure the congruency 
effect is different for subtraction compared to addition. Fourth, if the congruency effect observed for the 
subtraction equations was genuinely due to number processing, one would predict a distance effect to 
be present in the data. That is, as prime-target distance increases, response times should increase as well. 
Therefore, we assessed whether the data showed such distance-dependent priming effects. Fifth, Sklar 
et al. (2012) interpret that the congruency effect indicated that participants unconsciously solved the 
equations. It has recently been argued that such a claim is only warranted if reaction times are predictive 
of prime-target congruency. That is, accurate classification of the prime-target relationship should be 
possible from the reaction time distributions. 
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For the sake of brevity, we report all reanalyses for Experiment 6 only in the main text of this article. 
We refer to the Supplementary Materials for the results of the reanalysis of Experiment 7, which were 
qualitatively the same. An extensive overview of all calculations is also available in the Supplementary 
Materials, including the code used to process the data and conduct the analyses.  
 
Methods 
 
Data preparation 
We obtained the data from Sklar et al. (Sklar et al., 2012). All data were processed and analyzed in R 
3.3.2, a statistical programming language, and RStudio 1.0.44 (R Core Team, 2014; RStudio Team, 
2015). A complete overview of this analysis can be found in the R markdown file in the Supplementary 
Materials (https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4888391.v2). All data were visualized with the yarrr 
package version 0.1.2 (Phillips, 2016). 
 
Reanalysis #1: Repeatability of the reported analyses 
We followed all data processing steps reported in Sklar et al. to compute mean response times for each 
participant – condition combination. We used the afex package version 0.16-1 to recalculate the repeated 
measures ANOVA by using the aov_car() function (Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, & Aust, 2016). Type 
III sums of squares were used, as these are default in many commercially available statistical packages 
and because one of these (SPSS) was used by Sklar et al. to analyze the data. 
 
Reanalysis #2, #3, and #4: Bayesian linear mixed-effects models with crossed random effects  
As linear mixed-effects models do not require a fully balanced data set, we used the trial-level (raw) 
data for all analyses. To account for the positive skew of the response time distributions, all analyses 
were performed on logarithmically transformed response times (as in Moors, Boelens, van Overwalle, 
& Wagemans, 2016; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2016). All Bayes factors were calculated using the 
BayesFactor package version 0.9.12-2 (Morey, Rouder, Love, & Marwick, 2015). The Bayes factor 
refers to the ratio of marginal likelihoods of different statistical models under consideration (e.g., a 
model with a main effect of prime-target congruency versus an empty model with only random effects), 
quantifying the change from prior to posterior model odds: 
 
(|)
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In itself, the Bayes Factor can be interpreted as a relative measure of evidence for one statistical model 
compared to another. That is, the value of the Bayes Factor has no absolute meaning, and should always 
be interpreted relative to the statistical models under consideration. As Etz and Vandekerckhove (2016, 
p.4) put it: “The Bayes factor is most conveniently interpreted as the degree to which the data sway our 
belief from one to the other hypothesis.” Although the Bayes factor is inherently continuous, its values 
are sometimes partitioned into categories indicating different grades of evidence. For example, a Bayes 
factor of 3 or more is often associated with moderate evidence for one model, whereas Bayes factors 
larger than 10 are deemed strong evidence for that model. Bayes factors between 1/3 and 3 are often 
interpreted as providing equal support for both models, or anecdotal evidence for either model. Here, 
we take these categories as guidelines, but we do not wish to fall prey to traditional accept/reject 
classifications such as those that are standard in classical null hypothesis significance testing.  
 
We used the generalTestBF() function to calculate the Bayes factors associated with the full model (i.e., 
including all fixed and random effects of interest) and most reduced versions of the full model (the 
whichModels argument was set to “withmain”, such that interaction effects were only included if the 
respective main effects were also included in the model) (Rouder, Engelhardt, McCabe, & Morey, 
2016). With respect to the random effects, random intercepts were included for both participants and 
target stimuli. Initial analyses were also performed including random slopes for participants and target 
stimuli for the congruency effect. However, models including random slopes were never favored over 
models including random intercepts only. Therefore, we decided to drop random slopes altogether in 
the analyses reported here. All default prior settings were used (i.e., a “medium” prior scale for the fixed 
effects (r = 0.5), and a “nuisance” prior scale for the random effects (r = 1)). Our general strategy of 
reporting the Bayes factors is as follows. We extracted the model with the highest Bayes factor compared 
to an empty model (i.e., an intercept-only model) and considered this to be the model that predicted the 
data best (in the following referred to as “best model”). We then recalculated all Bayes factors such that 
they are compared to this best model. In all Tables, this yields an overview of the best model (Bayes 
factor = 1), and how strongly the data support the predictions made by this model compared to all other 
models. Because prior settings influence the Bayes factor, we also report on sensitivity analyses in the 
Supplementary Materials by varying the value of the prior scale of the fixed effects (which are of most 
interest here). We always included two models in the sensitivity analysis (i.e., yielding a single Bayes 
factor for each value of the prior scale). One of those was the best model, and in the other one the most 
important variable for the current reanalysis was included or excluded (depending on its inclusion in the 
best model). For example, if the best model contained only a main effect of prime-target congruency in 
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addition to the random effects, the sensitivity analysis would be conducted for this model and the model 
including random effects only. 
 
Reanalysis #5: A significant difference does not imply accurate classification  
For this analysis, we used the R code that was used in Franz and von Luxburg (Franz & von Luxburg, 
2015), which is publicly available (https://osf.io/7825t/). The classification analysis can be summarized 
as follows. The goal is to determine a threshold RT that can be used to classify RTs as either congruent 
or incongruent. In the case of the median classifier, the median RT is used as a threshold. In the case of 
the trained classifier, the data set is split into two halves, a training and a test set. For the training set, 
the threshold value is determined that leads to the fewest number of misclassifications, and this threshold 
is then applied to the test set. This was then repeated 10 times, and the average classification accuracy 
was taken as classification performance for the trained classifier. 
 
Results 
Reanalysis #1: Repeatability of the reported analyses 
We first assessed the repeatability of the statistical analyses reported in Sklar et al. (2012). Repeatability 
entails taking the raw single-trial data, applying the same processing steps as outlined in the methods 
section, and ending up with the same numbers reported by the authors in the original paper (Ioannidis 
et al., 2009). Importantly, repeatability without discrepancies implies that all following reanalyses are 
based on the same data set as used for the original publication. In short, this was the case (Figure 1A). 
For the subtraction condition, we observed a significant priming effect (F(1,15) = 16.79, p = .001), and 
no interaction between prime-target congruency and presentation duration (F(1,15) = 2.13, p = .17). As 
reported, we did not observe a priming effect for the addition equations (F(1,15) = 1, p = .33). We refer 
to the Supplementary Materials for the repeatability of all other analyses reported by Sklar et al. 
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Figure 1. Overview of the reanalyses (Experiment 6). (A) Reanalysis #1. Repeatability of the reported 
results. Priming effects (i.e., difference between incongruent and congruent condition, in ms) are 
depicted for the addition and subtraction equations, for both prime presentation durations. (B) 
Reanalysis #4. Effect of prime-target distance on response times. Response times (ms) are depicted in 
function of absolute prime-target distance. (C) Reanalysis #5. Classification of response times. 
Classification accuracy is depicted in function of the classifier type, median or trained. In all plots, thick 
lines indicate the arithmetic mean, dots depict data from individual participants, and the beans indicate 
fitted densities (Phillips, 2016). 
 
Reanalysis #2: (Bayesian) linear mixed-effects modeling with crossed random effects 
Next, we applied an alternative statistical model that is generally considered more appropriate for 
experimental designs such as the one used in Sklar et al. (2012), linear mixed-effects modeling (LMM) 
with crossed random effects for participants and stimuli (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Clark, 
1973). That is, in the experiments a sample of participants responds to a sample of stimuli (i.e., the target 
numbers) in a set of different conditions. This induces variability in reaction times not only due to 
participants, but also due to targets. Traditionally, repeated measures ANOVAs or paired t-tests are 
applied to data sets such as these in order to account for participant variability. However, the stimuli 
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used in the experiment also induce stimulus variation, which is traditionally not accounted for and can 
substantially increase Type I error rates (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). In psycholinguistics it is now 
standard to simultaneously model participants and items as random effects by relying on LMMs with 
crossed random effects (Baayen et al., 2008). Similar voices have been raised for social psychology 
(Judd et al., 2012; Wolsiefer, Westfall, & Judd, 2016), and these models have been applied in the CFS 
literature as well (Moors, Boelens, et al., 2016; Moors, Wagemans, et al., 2016; Stein, Kaiser, & Peelen, 
2015). Thus, to ensure proper Type I error control, we implemented LMMs with crossed random effects 
throughout our reanalyses. Furthermore, in contrast to ANOVAs, LMMs do not require a fully balanced 
data set. As such, the raw trial-level data can be used to model RTs, rather than having to rely on mean 
RTs. Table 1 summarizes the results of the Bayes factor analysis applied to the subtraction condition of 
Experiment 6. In line with the original results, the results indicate that a model containing only a main 
effect of prime-target congruency is the model that predicted the data best (“best model”). The Bayes 
factors in Table 1 do provide some insight into the strength of this evidence, however. That is, the best 
model is not strongly favored over a model that does not include prime-target congruency (model 4), or 
one that includes no effects at all (model 3). Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis between model 1 and 
model 3 indicates that this pattern generalizes across all prior scales except for the smallest two 
considered (r = 0.1 and r = 0.3). Here, the Bayes factors indicate stronger evidence for a model including 
prime-target congruency.   
 
Table 1. Bayes factor analysis of the subtraction data (Experiment 6).  
Model BF Error 
1. Congruency + Subject + Target 1 0 
2. Congruency + Presentation duration + Subject + Target 1.16 0.07 
3. Subject + Target 2.15 0.03 
4. Presentation duration + Subject + Target 2.65 0.03 
5. Congruency * Presentation duration + Subject + Target 10.87 0.05 
All other models >100 NA 
Note. All reported BFs are calculated with the model that predicted the data best (“best model”) in the numerator 
(the model for which BF = 1, top row). BFs > 1 therefore indicate how much more the data are consistent with this 
best model compared to the model under consideration in each row. A “*” indicates that both the main effects and 
the interaction between the variables are incorporated in the model. 
 
Reanalysis #3: Analysis of the claimed “congruency x operation” interaction 
Sklar et al. (2012) interpret the results of Experiments 6 and 7 as follows: “The results so far show that 
subtraction equations are solved nonconsciously and hence, are sufficient to confirm our hypothesis that 
complex arithmetic can be performed unconsciously. However, why did not we find evidence for 
nonconscious solution of the easier-to-solve addition equations?” (p. 19616).  
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This interpretation of their results in terms of finding a congruency effect for subtraction but not for 
addition is based on comparing a difference in significance levels. However, such an interpretation is 
not warranted because a difference in significance level does not imply a significant difference (Gelman 
& Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011). With respect to the study of Sklar et 
al., an interpretation of the results in terms of the possibility of unconscious arithmetic for subtraction 
but not for addition thus requires an explicit test of the interaction between prime-target congruency and 
operation. In any case, for an experimental design such as the one used in Sklar et al., it would be most 
straightforward to first analyze the 2 x 2 x 2 design as a whole (prime-target congruency x prime 
presentation duration x operation). Depending on the presence of interactions, the analysis could then 
be broken up into simpler ones. Here, we first analyzed the data using a 2 x 2 x 2 rm-ANOVA. The 
critical interaction indeed proved to be significant (F(1,15) = 9.88, p = .007). However, as highlighted 
before, such an analysis does not properly control the Type 1 error rate. Therefore, we subjected the full 
data set to the Bayesian LMM analysis, the results of which are reported in Table 2. Two things are 
notable. First, in contrast with the results of the rm-ANOVA, none of the models reported in Table 2 
includes an interaction between prime-target congruency and operation (or any other factor). Second, 
the best model does not include an effect of prime-target congruency. Although it is not strongly favored 
compared to models that do include an effect of prime-target congruency, the evidence for the absence 
of a congruency effect is notably stronger here compared to the evidence for the presence of a 
congruency effect in Reanalysis #2. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis between models 1 and 4 indicates 
that this pattern generalizes across all prior scales considered (i.e., the Bayes factor never switches 
towards indicating evidence in favor of the model including prime-target congruency).  
 
Table 2. Bayes Factor analysis for the full data set (Experiment 6). 
Model BF Error 
1. Target + Subject 1 0 
2. Presentation duration + Target + Subject 1.30 0.02 
3. Operation + Target + Subject 4.57 0.01 
4. Congruency + Target + Subject 5.28 0.02 
5. Presentation duration + Operation + Target + Subject 5.83 0.07 
6. Congruent + Presentation duration + Target + Subject 7.21 0.02 
All other models >100 NA 
Note. All reported BFs are calculated with the model that predicted the data best (“best model”) in the numerator 
(the model for which BF = 1, top row). BFs > 1 therefore indicate how much more the data are consistent with this 
best model compared to the model under consideration in each row. 
 
Reanalysis #4: The effect of numerical prime-target distance on response times  
We now turn to a reanalysis that was motivated by theory-based predictions from the number processing 
literature. The priming model proposed by Sklar et al. (2012) can be summarized as follows: the 
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arithmetic equation is solved, then the result (i.e., a number) is mentally represented, and this short-lived 
numerical representation influences the participant’s response to a subsequently presented number (i.e., 
the target). For symbolic primes and targets (e.g., Arabic numbers), it is commonly found that as 
numerical prime-target distance increases, priming effects decrease in a V-shaped manner (Reynvoet, 
Brysbaert, & Fias, 2002; Roggeman, Verguts, & Fias, 2007). This well-established feature of numerosity 
priming is generally explained by representational overlap between the prime and the target (Van Opstal, 
Gevers, De Moor, & Verguts, 2008). Thus, if the data reported in Sklar et al. (2012) involve genuine 
number processing, one should observe a V-shaped priming function for prime-target distances. To test 
for a V-shape, the absolute value of the prime-target distance was taken as a predictor. A positive slope, 
significantly different from zero, would indicate that prime-target distance influenced RTs in a V-shape 
manner. Table 3 shows the results of the Bayes factor analysis. As is apparent, distance was only 
included as a predictor in model 6, for which the evidence was considerably less strong compared to the 
best (empty) model (see also Figure 1B). For the sensitivity analysis we used models 1 and 6. Here, the 
pattern of Bayes factors also generalized across all different prior scales. 
 
Table 3. Bayes factor analysis of the prime-target distance (Experiment 6).  
Model BF Error 
1. Subject + Target 1 0 
2. Presentation duration + Subject + Target 1.34 0.01 
3. Operation + Subject + Target 4.40 0.04 
4. Presentation duration + Operation + Subject + Target 6.03 0.02 
5. Presentation duration*Operation + Subject + Target 9.12 0.06 
6. Distance + Subject + Target 14.67 0.01 
All other models >100 NA 
Note. All reported BFs are calculated with the model that predicted the data best (“best model”) in the numerator 
(the model for which BF = 1, top row). BFs > 1 therefore indicate how much more the data are consistent with this 
best model compared to the model under consideration in each row. A “*” indicates that both the main effects and 
in interaction between the variables are incorporated in the model. 
 
Reanalysis #5: A significant difference does not imply accurate classification  
In the abstract, Sklar et al. (Sklar et al., 2012) interpret the priming effects observed in their study as 
follows: “[…] multistep, effortful arithmetic equations can be solved unconsciously” (p. 19614). 
However, the result from which this claim was derived is the mean RT difference between the congruent 
and the incongruent condition (i.e., the priming effect). As recently highlighted by Franz and von 
Luxburg (Franz & von Luxburg, 2014, 2015), this type of analysis is not sufficient to make these claims. 
Specifically, the claim that participants are able to nonconsciously solve equations implies that the RTs 
should be predictive of the prime-target congruency with which they were associated. The idea behind 
the approach by Franz and von Luxburg is to leave the framework of classical null hypothesis 
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significance testing on mean RT data behind and ask how much information about prime-target 
congruence is available in the RT data. This empirical question is addressed by means of trial-by-trial 
classification: If the significant prime-target congruency effect on RTs is supposed to serve as evidence 
for “good” unconscious processing, then we should be able to use the RTs to decide for each trial 
whether the prime (i.e., the number representing the solution of the equation) and the target (i.e., the 
visible target number) were congruent or incongruent. According to the underlying priming model, small 
RTs would indicate a congruent trial, large RTs would indicate an incongruent trial. To test how good 
classification performance of the prime-target relationship was for the subtraction condition, we used 
two different classifiers, a median and a trained one (Table 4 and Figure 1C). The median classifier 
assumes that the data follow a log(normal) distribution, whereas the trained classifier is a standard 
distribution-free classifier from the machine learning literature. As can be derived from Table 4, the 
trained classifier performs completely at chance (50.88 %). The median classifier performs only slightly 
above chance (53.10 %). This indicates that the congruency effect for the subtraction data is only 
associated with poor classification of the prime-target congruency based on the RTs. 
 
Table 4. Classification performance for the subtraction data (Experiment 6).  
Classifier Mean SD SEM Median 
Median classifier 53.10 4.43 1.07 53.52 
Trained classifier 50.88 5.76 1.40 51.89 
 
Discussion 
In this article, we critically reanalyzed the data reported in Sklar et al. (2012). We first established that 
all analyses were repeatable without any discrepancies (Reanalysis #1). For making their data available 
to us and their research transparent, the authors should be applauded. Indeed, recent empirical 
evaluations have shown that the published biomedical literature generally lacks transparency, including 
public access to raw data and code (Goodman, Fanelli, & Ioannidis, 2016; Iqbal, Wallach, Khoury, 
Schully, & Ioannidis, 2016; Leek & Jager, 2016). Furthermore, a recent series of studies has indicated 
that half of the published psychology papers include at least one statistical inconsistency, and one in 
eight even a gross inconsistency (Nuijten, Hartgerink, van Assen, Epskamp, & Wicherts, 2015). 
Importantly, the full repeatability ensured that our following reanalyses were based on exactly the same 
data set as used for the original publication. 
 
We then applied four different analyses to the data set, inspired by methodological, statistical, and 
theoretical considerations. The results of these analyses can be summarized as follows: 
• When applying a statistical model that provides better control for the Type I error rate for the 
experimental design at hand, we showed that the evidence in favor of the presence of a 
congruency effect was not as strong as would be derived from the analyses that were reported 
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in the original article, albeit the fact that the best model did include an effect of prime-target 
congruency (Reanalysis #2). Thus, on purely statistical grounds, this result shows that merely 
accounting for item variability substantially attenuates the strength of the evidence for the 
reported priming effect. In essence, this does not contradict the result reported by Sklar et al. 
Nevertheless, we argue that the strength of the evidence provides an important nuance to the 
interpretation of these results.  
• The data do not strongly support the claim that unconscious arithmetic can happen for 
subtraction equations, but not for addition equations. That is, none of the models reported in 
Reanalysis #3 included an interaction between prime-target congruency and operation. 
Moreover, all BF analyses also indicated that the data were more consistent with statistical 
models not including an effect of prime-target congruency. Thus, an analysis based on the full 
data set rather than different subsets of the data revealed that no strong evidence for main effects 
of or interactions with prime-target congruency was observed.  
• No characteristic patterns of number processing – which have repeatedly and robustly been 
reported in the literature – are present in the current data set (Reanalysis #4). This indicates that 
one should be very cautious to invoke mechanisms related to number processing to explain these 
results. 
• Even if the priming effect is taken at face value after the results of the three previous reanalyses, 
the data set does not provide evidence that participants unconsciously solved the equations that 
were presented subliminally. That is, the classification of the prime-target congruency based on 
the reaction times is nearly at chance, calling into question the assertion that people can solve 
equations non-consciously (Reanalysis #5). Although the median classifier performed slightly 
above chance, its performance was still considerably lower than the performance that was taken 
to be the cut-off for establishing invisibility of the prime equations (60%). 
 
Taken together, we conclude that the converging nature of all four reanalyses indicates that the data used 
for invoking the existence of unconscious arithmetic contain little evidential value for those claims (i.e., 
evidential value in terms of the Bayes factors obtained in the reanalyses). Within the conceptual 
framework proposed by Goodman et al. (2016), our reanalyses therefore suggest low inferential 
reproducibility of the study by Sklar et al. 
 
A critical reviewer suggested that, based on the results of our reanalyses, one would expect that the 
original findings would not replicate easily. In this context, a direct replication of the study by Sklar et 
al., using the same experimental setup and exactly the same stimulus material, would be very 
informative. This was the goal of the recent study by Karpinski, Yale, and Briggs (2016). The authors 
used exactly the same materials as in Sklar et al., and aimed at replicating the original effect in a larger 
sample (n = 94). Interestingly, they obtained evidence for unconscious addition, but not subtraction (i.e., 
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opposite findings compared to Sklar et al.). As this data set would be very informative for our reanalysis, 
we contacted the authors of this replication study. Upon reanalyzing the data set together with the 
authors, it became apparent, however, that a coding error led to an incorrect calculation of the mean 
RTs. A corrected analysis of the data did not reveal any priming effects for unconscious additions or 
subtractions (Karpinski & Briggs, personal communication). That is, the critical paired comparisons for 
assessing priming effects for addition and subtraction both no longer passed the threshold for statistical 
significance (addition: t(93) = 0.11, p = .92; subtraction: t(93) = 0.23, p = .82). The paper has now been 
retracted. Thus, the single published replication study of the unconscious addition and subtraction effects 
reported in Sklar et al. actually failed to replicate the original pattern of results. Together with the results 
of our reanalyses, we argue that the results of this non-replication calls for caution when interpreting the 
original results. 
 
Exploring the scope and limits of non-conscious processing is essential for the formulation of theories 
of consciousness (Dehaene, Charles, King, & Marti, 2014). Since the results reported in Sklar et al. 
(2012) might have important implications for theories of (un)conscious processing (Dehaene et al., 
2014; Koch, Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016; Soto & Silvanto, 2014), we were motivated to conduct 
this critical reanalysis. If the reported effect is true, it can indeed be considered as an extraordinary case 
of subliminal perception and, as Sklar et al. argue, it might even “call for a significant update of our 
view of conscious and unconscious processes” (p.19614). In line with this notion, the senior author of 
this study recently suggested that “unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level 
function that conscious processes can perform” (p. 195) (Hassin, 2013). Non-conscious arithmetic 
would be the most recent culmination point in a decades-long debate among cognitive scientists about 
the existence and potency of subliminal perception (Doyen, Klein, Simons, & Cleeremans, 2014). This 
debate has been characterized by a repeating cycle of provocative claims followed by methodological 
criticism, primarily aimed at the psychophysical and statistical methods used to establish the absence of 
conscious perception (Hesselmann & Moors, 2015). Of note, for the purpose of this reexamination, we 
solely relied on the data that were used to claim the existence of nonconscious arithmetic. For example, 
we simply took at face value that the post hoc selected sample of participants, whose data were submitted 
to statistical analysis, did not see the arithmetic equations – these crucial aspects of data processing and 
their implications have been treated elsewhere (Shanks, 2016). 
 
The scientific study of consciousness has traditionally sought to assemble an exhaustive inventory of 
the psychological processes that can proceed unconsciously, in order to isolate those that are exclusively 
restricted to conscious cognition (Naccache, 2009). Over the course of the last decades, a large body of 
empirical evidence has been accumulated by applying this strategy, in particular within the domain of 
visual perception. Vision research provides a wide range of paradigms designed to transiently suppress 
visual stimuli from conscious perception, i.e., render a physically present target stimulus invisible for 
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neurologically intact observers (Bachmann, Breitmeyer, & Ogmen, 2007). These paradigms differ with 
respect to what types of visual stimuli can be suppressed from awareness, and how effective the 
suppression is in terms of duration and controllability of onset and offset (Kim & Blake, 2005). Along 
another dimension, the available paradigms may be placed within a functional hierarchy of unconscious 
processing, according to the extent to which features of visual stimuli are processed on an unconscious 
level and still induce effects on behaviour, e.g., in priming experiments (Breitmeyer, 2015). The results 
of our reanalysis can be framed into an emerging series of results that indicate that unconscious 
processing associated with CFS is not as high-level as previously thought (Hedger, Adams, & Garner, 
2015; Hesselmann, Darcy, Sterzer, & Knops, 2015; Hesselmann & Knops, 2014; Moors, Boelens, et al., 
2016), and that neural activity related to stimuli suppressed by CFS is considerably reduced already in 
early visual areas (Fogelson, Kohler, Miller, Granger, & Tse, 2014; Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013). 
Importantly, building such a functional hierarchy should eventually allow to formulate predictions on 
the level of unconscious processing that can be expected in a specific experimental setup. In the absence 
of prior assumptions on the depth of visual suppression associated with a specific paradigm, every new 
report of high-level unconscious processing seems equally plausible, and the boundaries of non-
conscious processing are ultimately pushed further and further.  
In sum, as extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, we were motivated to reanalyze the data 
obtained in Sklar et al. based on statistical, methodological, and theoretical considerations, and within a 
framework that allowed us to quantify the evidence for statistical models that reflected theoretical claims 
(i.e., unconscious arithmetic revealed through priming effects). Together with the recent non-replication 
of the original results (Karpinski et al., 2016) and a recent critique of the post-hoc selection of unaware 
participants that was used in the original study (Shanks, 2016), we argue that our results indicate that 
the evidence for the existence of unconscious arithmetic is inconclusive. This current state of affairs can 
only be overcome by cumulative research strategies, explicitly aimed at assessing the robustness of the 
findings and quantifying the strength of the evidence for the theoretical claims. 
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